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GENDERING AND ENGENDERING PROCESS
Elizabeth M. Schneider*
I begin this essay with the admission that I am an unabashed
proceduralist. I believe that Civil Procedure is by far the most im-
portant course in the first year of law school, indeed, that Civil Pro-
cedure may be the most important course in the entire law school
curriculum. Civil Procedure is the first course in which law students
are presented with issues of dispute resolution, problem-solving,
lawyering, ethics, professional responsibility, process, and the value
of process that cut across the entire law school curriculum.' Civil
Procedure is the law school course in which a respect for process
and an understanding of the concrete impact of process on human
lives must first be engendered.
Almost ten years ago, at an AALS Professional Development
Workshop for Women in Legal Education, a group of women law
teachers who teach procedure first met. We discovered that many of
us were also doing work in the area of women's rights and feminist
theory, and were attempting to bring these perspectives to bear in
our work in procedure.2 In the ensuing years, feminist scholars
have begun to explore the implications of these perspectives on pro-
cedure.3 It is critically important for us to examine the role of gen-
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. This essay is a revised version of a
speech given at the program, Feminist Procedure, jointly sponsored by the Association
of American Law Schools' (AALS) Sections on Civil Procedure and Women in Legal
Education at the AALS Annual Meeting, San Antonio, Texas, January 1992. An earlier
version of this essay was published in "Feminist Jurisprudence "--The 1990 Myra Bradwell
Day Panel, 1 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 6 (1991). I am grateful to Martha Minow for
conversations on feminism and civil procedure from which many of the ideas in this
essay emerged.
1. I have previously written about the importance of Civil Procedure to the law
school curriculum. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Rethinking the Teaching of Civil Procedure,
37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 41 (1987) [hereinafter Rethinking the Teaching]; see also Elizabeth M.
Schneider, "Feminist Jurisprudence'"--The 1990 Myra Bradwell Day Panel, 1 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 6 (1991) [hereinafter Feminist Jurisprudence].
2. AALS Workshop on Professional Development for Women in Legal Education,
New Orleans, La., Oct. 1984. Women procedure teachers again met at the AALS
Workshop on Professional Development for Women in Legal Education in Washington,
D.C. in October 1987. After this meeting, Judith Resnik and I developed and circulated
a questionnaire for procedure teachers to generate thinking on the intersection of
feminism and civil procedure and gather teaching materials. This resulted in a
bibliography that included materials on feminism and civil procedure that was
distributed as part of the course materials for the AALS Conference on Civil Procedure,
Charlottesville, Va., June 1988.
3. See generally Patricia A. Cain, Good and Bad Bias: A Comment on Feminist Theory and
Judging, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1945 (1988); Cynthia Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALEJ.L.
& FEMINISM 189 (1991); Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of Work in
1223
CINCINNATI LA W REVIEW
der in procedure and to explore the insights that feminist theory
may offer to our understanding of procedure, just as we have begun
to explore them in connection with many other courses in the cur-
riculum. The publication of this symposium, and the AALS panel
which generated it, reflects the burgeoning of feminist thinking on
procedure and enhances continuing dialogue on the intersections of
feminism and procedure.
Feminist scholarship on procedure underscores the richness and
complexity of this exploration of the intersections of feminism and
procedure. The range of topics discussed in this symposium, from
gender and jury selection to gender-bias in the courts to gender and
jurisdiction, highlight the degree to which issues of gender and the
social construction of gender affect central issues of procedure, and
the degree to which procedure affects issues of gender. Yet, talking
about this intersection is particularly complex, because as others in
this symposium have observed, neither feminism nor procedure can
or should be easily simplified. 4 There are not only multiple femi-
nisms, and multiple perspectives on feminism, 5 but as I have just
suggested, procedure is an enormously broad-ranging and cross-
cutting subject. The essays included in this symposium, and other
feminist scholarship on procedure suggest that we have just begun
to explore the possible intersections.
My particular interest in the intersection of feminism and proce-
dure has been the way in which fundamental aspects of feminist the-
ory and practice relate to the idea of process and contribute to our
theoretical perspectives on procedure, both in deepening our un-
derstanding of process and in providing analytic tools for critiquing
the procedural system. I have been involved in the women's move-
ment as an activist and academic for many years and much of my
scholarly work has focused on feminist theory and practice. 6 Over
Federal Trial Courts, 24 GA. L. REV. 909 (1990); Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender:
Women, Jurisdiction and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682 (1991);Judith Resnik, On
the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877
(1988); Schneider, Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 1; Schneider, Rethinking the Teaching,
supra note 1; Joan E. Steinman, Women, Medical Care, and Mass Tort Litigation, 68 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 409 (1992); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and
Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990).
4. Harold H. Koh, Two Cheersfor Feminist Procedure, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1201, 1205-07
(1993);Judith Resnik, Revising the Canon: Feminist Help in Teaching Procedure, 61 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1181, 1183 (1993).
5. See KATHARINE T. BARTLETT & ROSANNE KENNEDY, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY
(1991), for discussion and presentation of the range of feminist legal theories.
6. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and
Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520 (1992) [hereinafter Particularity
and Generality]; Elizabeth M. Schneider, Violence Against Women and Legal Education: An
Essay for Mary Joe Frug, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 843 (1992); Elizabeth M. Schneider
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the last ten years that I have been teaching procedure, I realized that
my interest in procedure, my love for procedure, and my concern
with process was deeply linked to my own feminism, to fundamental
aspects of feminist theory, and to my own experience of process in
the women's movement. 7 In other words, I began to see that what I
have called my unabashed proceduralism was linked and related to
my feminism in ways that I wanted to explore.
This essay explores this link between feminism and procedure. I
suggest that basic tenets of feminism and feminist theory reflect a
valuing of process, engender a sense of the importance of process,
and provide a basis for critical reflection on procedure. In the first
section, I offer a preliminary overview of some of the implications of
feminist theory for thinking about process. In the second section I
briefly discuss some examples of the way in which feminism and
procedure have intersected in my own work. Finally, I respond to
some concerns that have been raised as to the development of a
distinctively "feminist procedure."
I. FEMINIST PROCESS AND PROCEDURE: ENGENDERING PROCESS
Although there is no single feminist theory, but many feminist
theories, there are some common underlying themes. As Kate Bart-
lett has suggested, feminism can be viewed as a "self-consciously
critical stance toward the existing order with respect to the ways in
which it affects different 'women as women.' ' One of the most
exciting recent developments in feminist theory has been the effort
to expose feminism's own tendency toward essentialism, namely the
implication that there is one essential womanness. 9 Yet, a crucial
aspect of all feminist theories is what I have previously called the
Contradiction and Revision: Progressive Feminist Legal Scholars Respond to Mary Joe Frug, 15
HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 65 (1992) (with Judi Greenberg and Martha Minow); Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991) [hereinafter Violence of
Privacy]; Symposium, Lesbians, Gays and Feminists at the Bar. Translating Personal Experience
Into Effective LegalArgument, 10 WOMEN'S RTS L. REP. 107 (1988); Elizabeth M. Schneider,
The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
589 (1986) [hereinafter Dialectic]; Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing:
Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
REP. 195 (1986); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the
Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623 (1980); Elizabeth M. Schneider &
Susan B. Jordan, Representation of Women who Defend Themselves in Response to Physical or
Sexual Assault, 4 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 149 (1978).
7. Martha Minow and I first discussed this idea several years ago as part of a joint
project on feminism and civil procedure.
8. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 833 (1990).
9. See, e.g., ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION
IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
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dialectical relationship between theory and practice based on wo-
men's experience.' 0 Feminist theories share an emphasis on direct
and personal experience as the place that theory begins. Theory is
not something which is "out there," but "in here"; it develops from
our lived experiences, and grows out of the sharing of personal ex-
perience, reflected in the phrase "the personal is political." This
phrase reflects the notion that the individual and the group, the per-
sonal and political, the private world and the public world, are criti-
cally linked. Thus a fundamental aspect of feminist theory and
practice is an emphasis on process, the process of connection.
Consciousness-raising, as feminist method, is an example of this
dialectical and dynamic process. Consciousness-raising begins with
personal experience, experience which is usually conceived of as
"private." Through the sharing of personal experience, individuals
realize that their own experience is common to other women. This
insight moves the understanding of individual experience to the rec-
ognition that the commonality of women's experience reflects larger
social structures, and then moves back to the personal. Conscious-
ness-raising begins with the lived experiences of women, uses per-
sonal experience to understand, create, and inform theory, and then
reshapes theory based on the insights gained from exploring per-
sonal experience. The richness of this process, the moving back and
forth between the personal and the political, the private and the
public, exposes the complex, dialectical interrelationship between
the social dimension of individual experience and the individual di-
mension of social experience. Consciousness-raising reveals the
profound link between individual and group interest between indi-
vidual change and social change."
Feminist theory and feminist practice have valued process in other
ways as well. Feminism has valued process in the methods by which
women talk, the methods by which we organize meetings and organ-
ize organizing. Process has been viewed as important in and of it-
self, but also because process profoundly affects results and the way
in which people experience both process and result.
These perspectives on process that are fundamental to feminism
have important implications for procedure. First, there is an em-
phasis on the dynamic nature of process. Consciousness-raising is a
10. See generally Schneider, Dialectic, supra note 6. Because I see all feminist theories
based on this process-oriented dialectical relationship, I will use the term feminist
theory in this discussion.
11. I have recently expanded description of this dialectic in feminist theory and
practice to include a move from the particular to the general and back to the particular,
Schneider, Particularity and Generality, supra note 6.
[Vol. 611226
ENGENDERING PROCESS
paradigm, the moving back and forth between personal experience
and practice-private and public-an example of dynamic process
in action. Feminist theory emphasizes the dynamic nature of pro-
cess: that process is never constant or fixed, but always changing.
Attention to this dynamic nature of process has important analogues
in procedure. The dynamic nature of our procedural system is evi-
dent in the historical evolution of the Federal Rules, particularly to-
day, a time of enormous change and revision of civil procedure.
Recent developments such as the CivilJustice Reform Act of 199012
that challenge the traditional premise of "transsubstantive" proce-
dure' 3 emphasize the dynamic and evolving nature of the process.
On another level, at the level of individual litigation, procedure is
dynamic and constantly unfolding. A complaint is filed, which
brings on a response, and yet another response; the process of liti-
gation necessarily involves the emergence and unfolding of issues,
strategies, and problems. The very notion of procedure as a fixed
set of rules, a static framework, or even a linear unraveling, denies
the complexity, richness, and ad hoc nature of the procedural sys-
tem in action. A view of civil procedure as composed of rules or
doctrines that does not pay attention to the textured, chaotic, and
dynamic aspects of the process does not accurately reflect the nature
of procedure.
Feminist theory also values process because it has a transforma-
tive potential beyond the results in a given case or moment. In the
process of sharing insight, participating in group discussion or in
political activity, consciousness and identity can be transformed.
This understanding of process as potentially transformative has im-
plications for our thinking about procedure. The process of litiga-
tion, of asserting claims in legal form, can be transformative for
individuals and for groups. Asserting a claim in court can impart to
a group the power to effect change through legitimization, strength
in numbers, and a sense of solidarity.14 In the process of litigation,
individual claims can be transformed into group claims, both
through formal procedural mechanisms such as class action' 5 and
party joinder,' 6 and through more subtle processes of legitimiza-
tion. Of course, process can also be transformative in a negative
12. 28 U.S.C. § 473 (1988 and Supp. 1991).
13. Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84
YALE LJ. 718 (1975).
14. See, e.g., my discussion of this process in the women's rights movement in
Schneider, Dialectic, supra note 6.
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 19, 20, & 22.
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sense. The procedural system can also limit efforts for more radical
vision or thwart and frustrate activist energy.' 7 But feminist theory
helps us to understand the potentially transformative dimension of
process, and the difference that the type and availability of process
have on individual lives and political mobilization.
Feminist theory recognizes the interrelationship between process
and result: feminism recognizes that in a deep sense, process and
result are linked. Methods of institutional practice and decision-
making affect who is silenced and who can speak; the context in
which rules are applied affects their meaning. The meaning and im-
pact of an experience includes the way in which it unfolds and is
understood. So when we think, for example, about what process is
due, or consider the various values of process, we must consider
who can speak, the way in which procedural rules allow or deny ac-
cess to courts and the way in which process is experienced by indi-
viduals. But there is also the symbolic meaning of process, the
social meaning that processes take on for the larger society and the
way in which process is experienced by individuals. Different forms
of process take on different meanings then, both symbolically and in
fact.
Feminist theory contributes to unearthing hidden voices and
identifying rules and practices that have the effect of silencing the
views of those with less power. Feminist meetings have traditionally
taken account of the problem of silencing by paying close attention
to the methods of decisionmaking and access to speech. They have
attempted to facilitate greater participation of all individuals in
group process through procedural mechanisms such as having eve-
ryone speak by going around the room, or having a person who
talks call on the next person to talk. Emphasis on the way in which
procedural rules can provide vehicles to allow hidden voices to be
heard is important. Concepts of intervention 8 come to mind here;
as does the idea of giving litigants direct involvement in litigation
and paying attention to the way in which the process distorts direct
communication between litigants and the court. Feminist theory
underscores the importance of access and the need for a critique of
procedural rules that impose obstacles to participation, for example,
bonds and costs, denial of access to counsel, or those that chill vig-
orous advocacy or deter unfamiliar arguments, such as Rule 11.19
17. See William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29.
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
19. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 provides for sanctions for attorneys and
parties who submit pleading, motions, or other papers in court that are not "well
1228 [Vol. 61
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The valuing of process in feminist theory also provides a critique of
rules that measure due process by some kind of economic calculus
of the values at stake. 20
Another contribution of feminist perspectives on process to our
thinking about procedure is the interrelationship between individual
and group interests. The very process of consciousness-raising dis-
cussed earlier involves a dynamic process of individual discovery
and sharing of collective experience, and collective discovery and
sharing of individual experiences, in ways that then allow individuals
to experience commonality and to imagine their own strengths and
identity in a different way. In the formal civil procedural system, we
see these concerns reflected in rules on party joinder and class ac-
tion that address the question of the interrelationship between indi-
vidual and group interests and define the parameters of when
individual claims or group claims are appropriate. A common in-
sight from feminist discussions is that what an individual woman
thought was her own problem is widely shared and reflects larger
social structures. At the same time, as we recognize multiple femi-
nisms, we understand that all women's experiences are not the
same, and that some women cannot speak for all women. Complex
issues of representation, who may speak for whom, who may repre-
sent a class, are implicated in the procedural analogue. 2 1
Another example of feminist process is the experience of self-re-
flection and self-criticism. Implicit in the notion of consciousness-
raising is the importance of reflection, of reconsideration, that we
see in the dialectical notion of consciousness turning in on itself.
Feminist process and practice have historically involved feminist
groups discussing the methods by which to conduct a meeting, then
afterward meeting to reflect on process and decisionmaking and to
foster self-criticism. These themes of reconsideration and review
are reflected in procedural concepts of post-judgment relief and ap-
pellate review. For example, motions for new trial, judgments
notwithstanding the verdict, 22 and forms of appellate review provide
grounded in fact," "warranted by existing law," or are interposed for an "improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost
of litigation." FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
20. See generally Farina, supra note 3; White, supra note 3, for feminist perspectives
on due process.
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. For an important discussion of this problem in the context of
race and gender discrimination claims made by African American women, see Kimberle
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory And Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEG. FORUM
139. See also Martha L. Minow, From Class Action to Miss Saigon: The Concept of Representation
in the Law, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 269 (1991).
22. Now judgments as a matter of law, FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
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opportunities to construct more particularized forms of review and
reconsideration.
There is, however, an obvious tension between the desire to maxi-
mize opportunities for reconsideration and the need for finality and
closure. One of the criticisms of feminist methodology and activist
practice in the 1960s and 1970s was that there was too great an em-
phasis on process, and a failure to acknowledge the importance of
both final decisionmaking and different tiers of decisionmaking au-
thority. This tension is also present in our procedural system. For
instance, the concept of appellate review is based on fundamental
notions of the importance of adjudication by different tiers of deci-
sion makers, but there is a limit to the amount of review available.
Similarly, preclusion cuts off the possibility of reconsideration of is-
sues or claims that have been previously decided. Doctrines of final-
ity and preclusion balance the value of continued process, of
reconsideration and reflection, with the need for closure. Feminist
theory emphasizes the value of openness but also recognizes the ap-
propriateness of legal boundaries, the notion that at some point
there must be an end.
These are a few examples of how a feminist concern with and ex-
perience of process can deepen our perspective on procedure. How-
ever, I am not simply celebrating the process connection between
feminism and civil procedure. Feminist focus on process resonates
with many aspects of our procedural system, and has explanatory
force. However, feminist theory provides the basis for a self-con-
sciously critical stance towards law. Feminist process offers insights
for a critical analysis of procedure.
Feminist theory exposes the norms and values of different models
of procedural systems, challenges the notion of neutrality, and ques-
tions what is natural. But it must question what is natural beyond
simplistic dichotomies of what is "male" or "female." Some have
argued that the traditional image of litigation and of the adversary
system as "battle" is "male" while the alternative of dialogue and
connection has been posited as "female." 2 3 These dichotomies of
warfare versus connection are oversimplified.2 4 Although the adver-
sarial model of procedure is somewhat alien to the conception of
23. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982). Carol Gilligan's work has been interpreted, possibly
misinterpreted, to support this view.
24. For example, some feminist theorists have expressed concern that Gilligan's
articulation of connection as woman's mode of expression is too dichotomized. See, e.g.,
Schneider, Dialectic, supra note 6, at 616-17 n. 140; Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing
Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989).
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feminist process which I have been discussing, recent feminist work
has emphasized the danger of suppressing differences and disputes
within feminism and has called for attention to conflicting points of
view, competition, and other aspects of potential contention. 25
There are considerable dangers in positing the formal adjudica-
tion system as "male," in contrast with, for example, alternative dis-
pute resolution as "female." 26 Sensitivity to issues of power and the
problematic dichotomy of public versus private within feminist the-
ory underscores the dangers of this approach. Although in theory
alternative dispute resolution can be viewed as a form of more un-
structured and potentially dialogic process, this kind of informal
process can disadvantage women. Since women are in unequal
power relations to begin with, the problems that women face in us-
ing alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in battering, divorce,
or custody situations are considerable. 27 Indeed feminist concern
with process suggests that we should be critical of both the formal
system of adjudication and alternative dispute resolution, but sensi-
tized to power imbalance and the need for both dialogue and advo-
cacy in both contexts. Feminist concern with process can facilitate a
more complex and textured analysis of the ways in which different
forms of dispute resolution in different settings can both create op-
portunities for consideration and relief, reflect and correct power
imbalance, and affect mobilization.
Feminism can also assist us to rethink the tension between the
traditional procedural dichotomies of efficiency and fairness, and
the need for closure and the need for reevaluation and revision, and
provide a critical perspective on these dichotomies. Preclusion
rules, summary judgment, and dismissal reflect lines drawn by the
procedural system on all these matters. Feminists may at times pre-
fer more process, more evaluation than the civil rules provide but
feminist concern with access, process, and the importance of bound-
aries can provide a context for reconsideration and resolution.
In sum, feminist concern with process can assist us to explore a
richer, more focused, complex and contextual analysis of the role of
25. See generally CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn F. Keller eds.,
1990); Nadine Taub, Thoughts on Living and Moving with the Recurring Divide, 24 GA. L.
REV. 965 (1990).
26. See generally Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a
Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 52-53 (1985); Eve Hill, Alternative
Dispute Resolution in a Feminist Voice, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 337 (1990).
27. Tina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J.
1545 (1991); Lisa Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal
Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1984); Eleanor H. Norton,
Bargaining and the Ethic of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 568-74 (1989).
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process. Recognition of a link between feminist concern with pro-
cess and procedure does not mean either simple acceptance or re-
jection of existing procedural rules and their pattern of application.
Feminist theory can deepen our insights on procedure by emphasiz-
ing the importance of process, by raising hard questions, and by
identifying important areas of reform and challenge to existing pro-
cedural rules.
II. INTERSECTIONS: GENDERING PROCESS
I now turn to a brief consideration of some intersections between
feminism and procedure in two areas of my work on women's
rights-woman-abuse and the Hill-Thomas confirmation hearings.
The first raises questions about the gap between the symbolic na-
ture of process, the proliferation of processes and the limits of
meaningful process. The second is a teaching story about how gen-
der discrimination contexts can dramatize the importance of process
and procedure.
For more than fifteen years, I have been involved in work on wo-
man-abuse. Woman-abuse is the largest cause of death for women
in this country, and it is an urgent health problem which has only
begun to be recognized. 28 But woman-abuse did not exist as a legal
problem twenty years ago. The development of legal processes and
legal remedies that have been constructed as available, or at least
potentially available, for women who are the victims of abuse, were
developed in a context in which there were no legal claims, no legal
rights.29
An extraordinary proliferation of procedural remedies for wo-
man-abuse have developed over the last twenty years. Now there
are orders of protection, injunctive orders that a woman who is bat-
tered can get from a court to stop a man from beating her or restrict
his activity, although these orders are only "pieces of paper" and
likely to be ineffective because of lack of police enforcement. 30
There are criminal statutes that provide for arrest of batterers,
either for a violation of protective orders or for felonies generally. 31
There are tort remedies that have developed as a result of the aboli-
tion of interspousal immunity.32 There has been a move toward
more private and informal processes, notably mediation, which has
28. For fuller discussion of the problem of woman-abuse and the meaning of legal
remedies see Schneider, Violence of Privacy, supra note 6, at 980.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 990.
31. Id at 989.
32. Id.
1232 [Vol. 61
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been criticized by advocates who believe that it hurts battered wo-
men who are disadvantaged with respect to power, money, and re-
sources, and signals that battering is the individual woman's private
problem.33 More recently we see violence against women defined as
a civil rights violation,3 4 as an international human rights violation,
and as a form of involuntary servitude.3 5 We also have new anti-
stalking laws which expand the definition of the harm from battering
by criminalizing threats of violence and harassment.36
These are all forms of process that define battering differently and
convey different messages about the social impact. Making bat-
tering a crime against the state has a broader social and more public
meaning than an individual order of protection. The idea of bat-
tering as a civil rights violation also reflects a different set of mean-
ings than an individual order of protection. Defining battering in
the more general context of stalking, civil rights, or international
human rights, rather than in the particular context of woman-abuse,
conveys a less particular and more general social message.3 7
At the symbolic level, this proliferation of process has been im-
portant. The development of legal process can have an important
ideological impact in redefining the harm, shaping social conscious-
ness, breaking down the public and private dichotomy and legitimiz-
ing the seriousness of the problem. The development of these wide
range of legal processes has been critically important for these rea-
sons. However, on the practical level, although some of these reme-
dies have been very useful to individual battered women, none of
these remedies are likely to provide real protection for women who
are abused, or leverage to change their lives. Some aspects of the
legal process may be significant because the experience for a bat-
tered woman of being able to state in a public forum what hap-
pened, and have the judge take her seriously may be important.3 8
But none of these processes can deal with really protecting the wo-
man, changing her partner's intimate behavior, or creating life sup-
port and alternatives that will enable her to be safe. In addition,
because there is an absence of legal representation for women who
33. Id. at 988.
34. Id. at 989.
35. Id. at 989-90.
36. See, e.g., CAL. ANN. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (1993) (defining the crime of stalking as
"wilfully, maliciously and repeatedly follow[ing] or harass[ing] another person and
mak[ing] a credible threat with the intent to place that person (or his immediate family)
in reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury").
37. See Schneider, Violence of Privacy, supra note 6, at 990.
38. Id.
1993] 1233
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are abused in any of these contexts, meaningful access to these rem-
edies is very limited.
Thus, in the situation of woman-abuse, we have examples of both
the symbolic importance of process, and the limits of process to ef-
fect change. Looking at process in this concrete gendered context
provides a deeper understanding of the gap between the symbolic
and the real.
Another example of the intersection of feminism and procedure
was my experience during the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas Senate
Judiciary Committee hearings in using the proceeding to teach pro-
cedure. Like Harold Koh,39 I taught a class on procedural issues
presented by the Judiciary Committee hearings because the proce-
dural issues were so live and so sharply presented to the students.40
We discussed many issues including the nature of the proceeding
(fact-finding, adjudicative), public versus private forums, questions
concerning the nature of the decisionmaking process and the com-
position of the decisionmakers, the uncertain factual and legal stan-
dards involved in what had to be decided, lack of notice of the
processes and rules that were to be applied, the burden of proof on
the parties, the nature of the evidence that the Committee heard,
the decision to exclude evidence such as expert testimony, the na-
ture of lie detector tests and corroborating evidence, the role of race
and gender, and problems of credibility. The class was one of the
more successful classes that I have taught in tying together so many
different strands of procedure, because the situation presented such
fundamental questions about the significance of process and under-
scored the importance of procedure. As one of my students re-
marked after the class, analysis of the ad hoc and uncertain nature of
the procedural context of the hearing could turn anyone into a
"process freak." In this context, the gender and race issues, and the
significance of what was at stake, heightened the students under-
standing of the critical role of process and the critical link between
process and substance, a theme of the class. This class not only
gendered process, but engendered a deeper respect for process.
III. GENDERING AND ENGENDERING PROCESS
Consideration of the multiple intersections of feminism and pro-
cedure in this symposium and in this essay suggests the importance
of the enterprise. At the same time, it is clear that there are many
39. Koh, supra note 4, at 1203.
40. I taught this class at Harvard Law School, where I was visiting during 1991.
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different ways in which both feminism and a sensitivity to issues of
gender can enrich our teaching and thinking about procedure.
Feminism raises hard questions about procedure, and does not
provide simple answers. Feminism challenges dichotomies even
those of male versus female.4' Given the multiple voices of femi-
nism and procedure, there will be lively and continuing debate as to
the content of any claim to a distinctively "feminist procedure. '42
In the meantime, the contributions that gender and feminism can
offer to procedure and procedure to gender should be explored. By
gendering process, we can engender a greater understanding of, re-
spect for, and deeper critique of process. The challenge is to con-
tinue the exploration.
41. Koh, supra note 4, at 1205.
42. Id. at 1207.

